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1Introduction
Somalia is a nation of a little over eight million people that sits strategically on 
the Horn of Africa, at the entrance to the Red Sea.  Somalia’s climate is arid, with limited 
rainfall and has little fertile land for agriculture.  Due to the climatic conditions, Somalis 
are a nomadic people, mainly focusing on herding as a means of livelihood, especially 
before the industrialization of the country.  In response to the specific difficulties that this 
nomadic lifestyle produced, Somalis stratified themselves in clans.  The purpose of these 
social arrangements is to manage and appropriate the small amount of resources and 
provide aid or assistance to clan members when necessary.  Although there are six major 
clans, and literally hundreds of sub clans, Somalia holds the rare distinction as being one 
of the few countries in Africa that has a basically homogenous population, as almost all 
of the inhabitants of the country are ethnically Somali and over 99% of Somalis are 
Muslim.  However the homogenous nature of the country has not prevented strife; in fact,
Somalia has experienced only nine years of democracy since independence in 1960 and 
has been in a state of continuous civil war since 1991.  
The civil war in Somalia, which is still unresolved, arose out of the power vacuum 
resulting from the overthrow of the Somali dictator Siad Barre in 1991.  Barre ruled 
Somalia from 1969 to 1991 and is responsible for a great deal of Somalia’s problems 
today.  Although a tenuously unified movement effectively deposed Barre, none of the 
clan based opposition groups planned for what would happen after Barre’s defeat.  
Furthermore, the policies of tribalism, and Barre’s creation of clan rivalries and use of 
clan based violence, created a situation in which the various clans were all competing for 
power, with no desire or arena for negotiation and peaceful transition.  This competition 
2was further fueled by the large amount of cold war era weapons available in Somalia, a 
result of Barre’s mismanagement and the willingness of the USSR and the USA to 
provide Somalis with weaponry.
One of the main impediments to ending the civil war in Somalia today is the 
inability of the various clans to compromise and end their violent conflict.  These clans 
are by no means a new development in Somalia, as they have existed since people first 
began to settle in Somalia.  Their traditional purpose was to act as an extended network 
of kinship, which served to assist members of the clan and deal with community 
problems.  Starting in the colonial period and extending to the end of Siad Barre’s regime 
in 1991, clans transformed into armed militias bent on achieving power and eliminating 
other rival clans.  This new incarnation of clans has been the driving force behind 
Somalia’s fifteen year long civil war and is responsible for the displacement of over one 
million Somalis from their homes.  With an influx of displaced Somalis settled in other 
parts of the world, an interesting trend has emerged regarding the refugees’ clan 
allegiance and the role and importance of clans within Somali populations outside of 
Somalia.
One of the main destinations for these refugees has been the United States.  
Within the United States, Columbus Ohio has become a popular destination and today it 
is home to the second largest Somali population in the United States.  One of the most 
interesting characteristics of the refugees is the fact that they do not display the extreme 
clan rivalries present in Somalia, but instead serve as a universal model of unity and 
willingness to help other Somalis.  The existence of such a complete contradiction 
between the roles of clans in Somalia as opposed to in the Somali Diaspora raises 
3questions about the true nature of Somali clans and what caused their unfortunate 
development.  The evolution of Somali clan structure from a traditional model of kinship 
to the power hungry gangs that exist today was fueled by misguided European policies, 
Cold War politics, and the poor governance and tribalism of Siad Barre.  However, when 
freed from the confines of perpetual civil war, the traditional model of the clan returns to 
Somali refugees, demonstrating the fluidity of the concept of clan and a hope that 
Somalis can unify their country and end the civil war.  As a result, this study seeks to 
explore the changing function of clans in Somali society and provides an examination of 
clan affiliation and identity in Columbus, Ohio.  
Clans in Somali Society to 1969  
Clans have always been an integral part of Somali society.  Muhammad Farah 
Aidid, the de-facto leader of Somalia from 1991 to 1993, writes: “the very fact that this 
social structure has been continuing for thousands of years without much change despite 
colonial rule and an oppressive military regime under Siad Barre shows its strength, 
utility, and capability to solve the various problems and exigencies of their difficult life.”1
Since the first people started settling in Somalia before the tenth century, clans have 
provided a social structure to facilitate survival and access to resources in Somalia’s 
harsh environment.  There are six main tribes or clans in Somalia: the Dir, the Isaq, the 
Hawiye, the Darod the Digil and the Rahanweyn.  There are a number of smaller clans, 
and also an uncountable number of sub clans.  These clans have elaborate genealogies 
that can be traced through generations, showing the origins of the sub clans, and serving
as a means of locating specific members in the Somali social structure.  I.M. Lewis, the 
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4premier scholar on Somalia, writes “what a person’s address is in England, his genealogy 
is in Somalia.” 2  This genealogy can be further broken down into Somali groups called 
reers, which can number anywhere from the hundreds to the thousands.   These reers are 
comprised of a number of families which are closely related to each other, usually 
descended from a common ancestor, and are responsible for fulfilling obligations arising 
from blood feuds or conflicts.  Each reer has a xeer, similar to a treaty or contract, and “it 
is constantly revised in view of the changing circumstances like the conditions relating to 
the fragmentation of groups which have become too large or unwieldy to continue as 
manageable units, fissions arising out of mutual quarrels, rivalry for political control 
among leading elders or differences.”3  These xeers serve to bond clans, sub clans, or 
reers together on certain issues, but can also create conflict as xeers can pit groups 
against one another.4  Another key element in clan relations is the concept of the diya-
paying group.  According to Somalia traditional law xeer, if a man is killed, blood 
compensation dictates a payment of a hundred camels.  The diya-paying group of the 
victim would collectively claim the damages from the killer’s group.  This practice 
allows for effective redress and sanction for conflicts between groups in a pastoral 
society.5  
Clan conflict in pre-colonized Somalia was ever-present; however, it was also 
controlled and isolated.  I.M. Lewis writes that clans were “driven by the poverty of their 
resources to intense competition for access to water and grazing”, both extremely 
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5important in a desert area where resources as limited6.  Clan conflict also frequently arose 
over blood feuds that reers were required to uphold.  However because the clans were 
decentralized, and scattered throughout the country, mass clan conflict did not exist and 
conflicts were not internalized.  In fact, depending on the xeer, a clan that once was an 
enemy could easily in the future become a friend.  This fluidity is explained in the Somali 
proverb “to protect yourself from your son, rely on your brother; for protection from your 
brother, rely on your son.”7  Examples of the traditional actions of clans can include the 
community donating animals to a family whose livestock had died in a draught; or the 
community can stand as one and take action if rustlers came and took a member’s camels.  
In a more urban setting, an indigent person can be assured of a place to stay and food to 
eat if they find another member of their clan.  Thus, ones clan serves as a safety net 
throughout life in case of need, regardless of the circumstances.   
Somalia avoided European expansion until the 1880s when the Italians used the 
Berlin Conference to attain colonies to help their struggling economy and the British 
expanded further south from pre-existing outposts.  The British and Italian territories 
would eventually fuse and become Somalia as it exists today.  The clans played only a 
minor role during the colonial era; however the European powers did occasionally pit 
clans against each other.  For instance, when Sayyid Muhammad rebelled against the 
British and created what some called the first Somali nationalist movement; the British 
armed various clans and instigated rivalry and strife, leading to clan conflict and 
minimizing the impact of Muhammad’s movement.8  One of the main reasons that clan 
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6conflict remained isolated is the clans decentralized structure.  Because they were not 
included in the colonial governments, clans in the south had little knowledge, contact, or 
interest in the activities of clans in the north and vise-versa.  Furthermore, since so many 
Somalis were nomads in the vast interior, they avoided many European social controls
which were more endemic and pervasive in the coastal regions and urban centers.  Thus, 
even when instigated by colonial powers, clan conflicts could only escalate to a certain 
point before Somalis lost interest or naturally solved the conflicts, similar to clan feuds 
before European arrival.
After the global reconfiguring of the post World War II period, northern and 
southern Somaliland became a United Nations Trust Territory, which was in theory a 
transitional stage to prepare the indigenous peoples’ for independence and majority rule. 
As with many African nations trying to find a nationalistic identity after the conclusion of 
World War II, Somalis founded the Somali Youth League (SYL) in 1945, which would 
serve as the main opposition party to colonial occupation.  Although characterized by 
internal difficulties in organizing and clan cooperation, the Youth League managed to 
maintain itself as a viable, united force and protested against the British administration in 
the north and the Italian administration in the south.  
In 1960, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland technically merged to form an 
independent Somalia.  The SYL was extremely important in the initial transition period
and, in the first elections of 1961, won an overwhelming majority in the newly created 
National Assembly.  Coinciding with the seemingly democratic situation, the president, 
prime minister, and cabinet represented a carefully balanced group from different clans 
and different parts of the country.  As the following information shows, all of the six 
7major clans were continuous and proportionately represented in the government during 
the years of 1960, 1966, 1967 and 1969:  Darod- (6,6,6,6); Hawiye- (4,3,4,5); Digil and 
Rahanweyn- (2,3,3,2); Dir- (0,1,1,0); and Isaq- (2,3,4,5).9  This example of clan 
cooperation demonstrates that when given the opportunity, clans worked together for the 
benefit of the entire nation of Somalia.  It also shows a plateau of clan based politics in
lieu of attempted national government.     
However, as the 1960s progressed, Somalis had an increasingly difficult time 
keeping clan lineages and clan based parties out of the political sphere.  Whereas in the 
1964 election there was still a nationalistic spirit of clan compromise, the 1969 elections
represent a much more clan influenced event.  There were over 1000 candidates and 63 
different parties represented contesting 123 seats, demonstrating that the allure of power 
was enough to splinter the fragile sense of Somali nationalism.  Mismanagement of 
finances was rampant as many candidates spent huge portions of the budget to run their 
campaigns; some candidates spent as much as 30,000 dollars when the nation’s budget 
was around thirty million.10 However the outcome of the anarchic election ceased to be 
relevant when, on October 21, 1969, Chief of the Armed Forces Mohamed Siad Barre 
staged a bloodless coup and seized power.
Somalia’s short lived democratic period was a very influential one.  In many 
ways, the inability of Somalis to unify their country illustrates the problems that the 
British and Italians left behind.  In a more general sense, it highlighted issues concerning 
cooperation and access to power that would re-emerge at the conclusion of Barre’s reign 
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8and have plagued Somalia for years.  First, newly independent Somalia faced many 
problems that it inherited from the Europeans.  Forced centralization became one of the 
main barriers to clan unity.  In pre-colonial Somalia clans interacted and co-existed, but 
did not have to join together and make political decisions for the benefit of the whole 
country.  
Democracy as a concept was no stranger to the Somalis, for the traditional method 
of governance was based on allowing committees guddi or selected representatives guurti
to debate until a decision that all agreed on could be reached.  Although based on the 
same principles, Somali democracy, the “customary process of decision making [which] 
is democratic almost to the point of anarchy,” and Western style democratic republics are 
not the same.11  The European system focused on choosing a few people to represent the 
whole country, while the traditional Somali system is much more oriented for smaller 
communities.  By forcing the clans to unify, especially in a Western style government 
foreign to them, and providing them with no training or a practice period, Europeans 
essentially set up the Somalis for failure.
The union of the British controlled Northern Somaliland and the Italian controlled 
Southern Somaliland also provided infant Somalia with some major issues concerning 
unification.  Differences between the north and south of Somalia included: currencies, 
administrative languages, legal traditions and systems, style of government, cultural 
priorities and others.  Since the Somali people had no formal written language until 1971, 
many of these differences were especially disorienting.12  In addition to forcing Somalis 
into a foreign government structure that totally undermined their traditional system of 
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9governance, the Europeans did not allow any Somalis to actively participate during the 
colonial period and thus poor leadership was a large problem for the Somalis.  Initially 
the SYL did a remarkable job in terms of uniting Somalis under a nationalistic banner.
However once those in the government understood the power that they wielded, 
especially when it came to allocating resources, many of the nationalistic principles were 
abandoned in favor of tribalism.  Tribalism is the process of using one’s ethnic affiliation 
to determine access to rights, privileges and resources.  One method in which early 
Somali politicians used tribalism was concerning the allocation of government funds.  
For instance, the Somali National Treasury was relieved of around eight million US 
dollars by those in leadership positions and used to help certain SYL candidates in close 
election races.13  When Siad Barre took power in 1969, many believed that he could bring 
an end to some of Somalia’s early problems; however, Barre’s reigns did nothing but 
exacerbates the pre-existing issues and create new, more destructive ones.
Clans and Political Conflict under Siad Barre’s Rule 1969-1991
The regime of Siad Barre can be divided into two phases.  From 1969-1978, Barre 
promoted Somali nationalism and with assistance from the Soviet Union attempted to 
improve Somalia’s social, economic and military conditions.  However, after defeat in 
the Ogaden War, Barre’s policies from 1979-1991 changed substantially into that of a 
paranoid despot, who used foreign aid from the United States to further suppress his 
opposition.  Siad Barre was born in 1919 in the city of Ganane in Italian Somaliland, and 
was a member of the Marehan clan.  Barre, who had no formal education, started his 
career as a policeman in Italian Somaliland, and then ascended through the ranks of the 
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military.  In 1965, he became Chief of Staff for Somali Army.  The fact that his 1969 
coup was relatively bloodless demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the previous regime 
and the fact that, initially, Barre enjoyed popular support.  In support of his coup, in a 
1971 London Times interview, he stated “injustice and maladministration, lack of social 
progress and economic development, coupled with a sinking national morale, compelled 
us to bring about a change.”14  Barre’s first major “improvements” were to abolish the 
National Assembly, suspend the constitution, and ban political parties, which he said had 
thus far only been used to further the goals of individual clans.  Barre stated that the goals 
of his regime were to “end tribalism, nepotism, corruption, and misrule.”15  Furthermore, 
Somali unification and any other national liberation movements were to be supported.  
Barre also established the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) which was the single 
party in Somalia.  
The 1960s were a pivotal period for the entirety of Africa.  Known as the period 
of decolonization, over thirty countries achieved independence from European powers 
Great Britain, Portugal, France, and Belgium during this decade.  The newly independent 
states all had to deal with a variety of issues, one of which was how to embrace their 
incorporation into the international community. Because of the emphasis placed on 
global cold war politics almost instantly upon their independence, these nations faced the 
pivotal decision whether to ally with the United States or the USSR.  Both countries 
avidly courted third world nations as strategic allies, and also as buffers and spaces for 
military bases.  Perhaps because of their former oppressors’ connection to the free market 
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economies of the West, or perhaps because of cultural similarities to communist 
ideology, many African countries chose to adopt communism shortly after independence.  
Some examples of the many nations that attempted communist programs or governments 
include Ghana, Tanzania, Guinea, Senegal, and Somalia.
In 1970, to celebrate the first anniversary of the successful coup, Siad Barre and 
the SRC announced that Somalia would dedicate itself to a policy know as Scientific 
Socialism.  The literal translation in Somali means “wealth-sharing based on wisdom,”
and it emphasized the concepts of unity, self-reliance and self help.16  Some historians 
feel the decision to embrace the Soviet bloc’s ideology was a result of a rejection of the 
previous government’s Western leanings and the nation’s growing dependence on 
Russian aid and arms shipments, which had first started in the mid 1960s.  Another 
sensible conclusion would be Somalia’s hesitance to ally with the United States because 
of their support of Haile Selassie’s government in Ethiopia, who were historic enemies of 
Somalia.  In addition to receiving aid, much of it military, from the USSR, Somalia 
adopted various socialist initiatives and programs.  However, it is important to understand 
that Somalia’s transition to socialism did not always manifest itself to a majority of the 
populous.  The rural nomadic herdsmen, who still made up a large percentage of the 
country’s population, were often not immediately affected by the government’s policies; 
in some cases they were not affected at all.  Furthermore, although the SRC did in 
actuality institute many socialist policies, it always was more dependent on the USSR’s 
financial contributions than its ideological ones.
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One of the most significant changes that occurred during Scientific Socialism was 
the manner in which clans were able to operate.  Scientific Socialism represented a 
transition to a vehement condemnation of tribalism; the official slogan of tribalism 
became “tribalism divides [where] socialism unites.” The “Campaign Against Tribalism”
began in 1971; dubbed Olol, it was a nationwide attempt to battle corruption and 
resuscitate Pan-Somalism and national unity.17  Although the government’s attempt to 
consolidate unity and downplay factionalism in its early stages is understandable, many 
of its policies were stifling to traditional clan activities and the punishments many times 
unreasonable.     
The SRC’s policy towards tribalism ranged from interesting to oppressive 
methods to instigate nationalism and suppress traditional clan activities.  The diya or 
blood compensation was outlawed and replaced by a state controlled death penalty.  In 
efforts to cut rural and urban clan dependence, the government began to provide money 
for funeral expenses for those who died in towns without relatives.  A state sponsored 
program to urbanize the country and relocate groups of nomads was also initiated.  The 
government set up digmos, socialist orientation centers, which were to serve as social and 
political hubs, and also where weddings now had to be held.  The SRC also renamed 
districts and regions that had clan based names and the traditional greeting of “cousin” 
ina adeer was outlawed and replaced by “friend” jaalle, in order to minimize the kinship 
connotations.  Finally, civilian or military personnel took over leadership positions that 
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clan leaders once held and (guddi)s were ignored as decision making bodies.  The 
penalties for violating these laws ranged from fines to jail time to death.18
Especially because of the harsh penalties associated with actively supporting 
tribalism, many clan based activities were subdued in the 1970s.  In the rural areas where 
the government’s reach was minimal, most clans followed the same way of life they had 
for centuries; however because the urban centers were closer to the administration, many 
people did began to undervalue or even sever traditional clan ties.  As the 1970s 
progressed, one of the main goals of the SRC was to continue to stimulate Somali 
nationalism.  One of their most successful programs was that of the creation of a national 
written Somali language.    
The challenges that Somalia faced after independence concerning language were 
daunting.  Somalia had no indigenous written language, and the colonial legacy left 
Somalis in the south that did not speak or write English and Somalis in the north that did
not speak or write Italian.  93% of the country was illiterate, demonstrating the strength 
and longevity of the Somali oral tradition and also the considerable difficulty that faced 
the SRC.  In 1971, the SRC nationalized education and with a budget of around $14 
million set in motion a plan to create a Latin (Roman) based alphabet and administrate a 
massive literacy campaign.  After a year of introduction and intensive teaching in the 
urban areas, the SRC sent over 30,000 students into the vast countryside to teach the 
nomadic Somalis.  The creation of a national language was not only an enormous 
stimulus to Somali nationalism, but also greatly increased the cohesion and efficiency of 
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the Somali civil service.  By the late 1970s, Somalis had succeeded in raising the literacy 
rate from 7-10% in 1969 to nearly 60%.19
One of the most emphatic nationalistic impetuses for all Somalis was the pursuit 
of “Greater Somalia” or the unification of all Somali people, which stems from the idea 
of ethnic-cultural nationhood embracing all Somalis regardless of where they live.  In 
addition to residing in Somalia, people belonging to the Somali ethnic group also inhabit 
parts of what is today Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya.  In fact the Somali flag which has a 
five pointed star on it represents the various places that Somalis live.  Two points are for 
the British and Italian Somalilands, now united as one and the other three points represent 
Somali claims to Djibouti, the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, and the northeast corner of 
Kenya.  All of these regions have large Somali ethnic populations and unifying them has 
always been a basic goal of Somalis.  During the nine years of democracy, Somalia had 
already entered into a brief conflict with Kenya over land claimed by Somalis, but it had 
ended without developing into anything more than isolated conflicts.20  One of Barre’s 
main goals was to unite all Somalis in the region.  With military assistance from the 
Soviet Union, Barre prepared for his conquest, and what would become the turning point 
in his rule. 
The desert region of Ogaden is located in south-eastern Ethiopia.  Somali nomads 
arrived in the region over 500 years ago and have historically utilized Ogaden’s 
waterholes for their herds.  Somalis have always viewed the region as theirs; mostly 
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because the population is comprised of mostly Somalis, and also because the region only 
ended up being given to Ethiopia when Europeans divided up Africa.  Adan Abdulle 
Osman, president of the Somali Republic from 1960 to 1967, stated: “unlike any border 
problem in Africa, the entire length of the existing boundaries, as imposed by the 
colonialists, cut across the traditional pastures of our nomadic population.  The problem 
becomes unique when it is realized that no other nation in Africa finds itself totally 
divided along the whole length of its borders from its own people.”21  There have been 
numerous conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia concerning rights to the region through
out the past five hundred years but, in the early 1970s, the creation of the Western Somali 
Liberation Front (WSLF), a Somali separatist organization within the Ogaden, combined 
with political transitions within Ethiopia provided the spark which would ignite the 
Ogaden War of 1977-1978.  
The 1970s was a time of major political transition in Ethiopia.  In 1974 Haile 
Selaisse was deposed by a military junta called the Derg, which in Ge’ez means 
committee or council.  The Derg assuming political power had two major influences on 
Somalia.  Firstly the political chaos that ensued during this transition period allowed for 
both the strengthening and increased opportunities for the WSLF to expand its activities.  
Secondly, the Derg understood that their radicalization of Ethiopian politics had began to 
worry the United States, and in 1976 unveiled a Marxist-Leninist ideology, which was 
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quickly followed by a 380 million dollar arms deal with the USSR and the end of US aid 
by early 1977.22  
As aforementioned, Somalia was also an ally of the Soviet Union.  In addition to 
the aid they had been receiving since the mid 1960s, and their transition to scientific 
socialism in 1970; Barre signed the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the 
Soviet Union in July 1974.  In exchange for protection, and military and economic 
assistance, the Soviets were able to build military structures and utilize Somalia’s land.  
Barre’s confidence in his troops with Soviet military assistance, coupled with his desire 
to gain the ultimate victory in Somali nationalism and unite Greater Somalia, led him to 
support the WSLF with resources and, as the conflict progressed into 1978, eventually 
declared war on Ethiopia.  
The WSLF had such striking initial success that, by mid 1977, they had gained 
control of the entire Ogaden region with the exception of three cities.  However, what 
originally had began as a separatist movement was evolving into a full scale war.  Barre 
and the Somalis, although impassioned by the successes of the WSLF were very worried 
about the continued presence of the Soviets in Ethiopia.  In addition to supporting both 
countries and refusing to choose sides, the USSR pressed the Somalis to withdraw its 
support of the WSLF.  In September 1977, Barre traveled to Moscow to try and convince 
the Soviets of the Somali cause, however was unable to do so.  One reason could be 
Somalia had no history of class conflict and the Soviets felt as if Ethiopia provided a 
better chance for a socialist revolution.  Another reading can simply be that Barre was 
overestimating the importance of Somali to the Soviets.  Perhaps if the Soviets and the 
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Somalis enjoyed an equal relationship the situation would have been different, however 
the Soviets did not need the Somalis and when the Somalis refused to live in peace with 
Ethiopia, the Soviets did not feel any pressure to stay on the side of the Somalis.  
Although Somalis felt betrayed by the Soviets, they were not going to abandon 
their attempt to re-conquer the Ogaden.  In November 1977, the Somalis officially broke 
off diplomatic ties with the USSR claiming that they had violated the 1974 treaty of 
Friendship.  In addition to severing diplomatic ties, they expelled Soviet personnel and 
reclaimed military bases used by the Soviets.  Somalia immediately began to look for 
other countries for economic assistance; however, it was unsuccessful.  Although the 
situation would change within a year, the United States had no interest in aiding a country 
that had just invaded another.  Many African countries accused Somalia of violating the 
Charter of the OAU by supporting the WSLF and refused to assist them.  Although, in 
early 1977, the Saudis had offered Somalia 400 million dollars to expel the Soviets, that 
offer was no longer on the table when Barre in actuality did expel the Soviets.  
The Soviet switch signaled the end for Somalia in the Ogaden War.  Over the next 
12 months, Moscow airlifted over one billion dollars of military aid to Ethiopia.  
Additionally, the Soviets provided the Ethiopians with 18,000 Cuban troops.  The sheer 
amount of aid that the Soviets gave to the Ethiopians is surprising and registered as the 
largest airlift of men or materials anywhere in Africa.  It is reported that the initial phases 
of operations, not including later deliveries by sea, “involved 225 planes, about 12% of 
the entire Soviet fleet, with 1500 Soviet advisors and 10000 Cubans.”23 After the 
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Ethiopians were re-enforced by the USSR and Cuba, it did not take long to defeat the 
Somali army and by March 1978 the majority of the fighting was over.  
The Ogaden War is extremely important in understanding why clan politics 
changed in Somalia during the 1980s.  Siad Barre had successfully stimulated enough 
nationalist fervor to attempt to create “Greater Somalia;” however, after his failure in the 
war, this nationalism quickly receded.  The war was a disaster for the Somali military, 1/3 
of its soldiers were killed ¾ of its armored units destroyed and it lost ½ of its air force.24
In total, 25,000 Somalis were killed out of a population of only five million.  The war 
also produced over 700,000 refugees, many of whom lost their homes after Ethiopia 
emptied the disputed region.  Somalia had few resources to deal with these refugees, 
especially after their military loss and the loss of Soviet aid.  Considering their lack of 
resources, the government handled the situation competently and devoted many of the 
same people and tactics they used for their earlier mass literacy campaign to aid the 
refugees.  The SRC established the National Refugee Commission (NRC) which 
administered to many ad-hoc refugee camps that were financed mostly by NGOs and 
sympathetic Western charity organizations.  Eventually the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) assumed control and also the one hundred million 
dollar a year cost to administer the refugee camps.25  
After the Ogaden War, Somali citizens became less and less enamored by Barre’s 
nationalism and scientific socialism and more and more skeptical of his ability to lead the 
country.  Barre however was aware that his policies were failing and now took an avid 
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role in maintaining his power by suppressing opposition.  In order to appeal to the people 
after the catastrophic loss, Barre and the SRC created a new constitution in 1979.  
Although it claimed to be an extension of Somali rights, in actuality it solidified Barre’s 
control over the power structures in Somalia.  Barre now found a new benefactor and 
forged an alliance with the United States.  The bargaining began at two billion dollars for 
the land rights for US military bases in Somalia; however due to a desperate need for 
money and poor diplomacy, Somalia agreed on sixty-four million dollars, 2/3 of which 
would be paid in arms shipments.26  After this agreement was signed in 1980, Somalia 
was clearly no longer aligned with the Eastern bloc, and thus no longer promoted or 
administered any progressive programs instituted under scientific socialism.  In fact, after 
1980 there were no sizable domestic improvement projects undertaken by the 
government.  In essence, Siad Barre and the SRC ceased trying to rebuild their country 
and instead focused on maintaining power.   
After the conclusion of the Ogaden War, Siad Barre entered the second phase of 
his regime, that of oppression and tribalism.  Whereas tribalism had previously been an 
offense punishable by jail time, Barre now used it to control the people.  Barre created 
clan rivalries by using violence and financial and promotional incentives to keep the 
various clans competing and distracted.  Furthermore, Barre began to actively oppress all 
clans that were not his own.  The three major clans that Barre relied upon were his own 
Marehan clan, the Ogaden clan of his mother and the Dolbahante clan of his favorite son 
in law, which earned him the nickname MOD.27  These three clans made up a majority of 
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key governmental positions that ensured Barre’s power.  His fellow Marehan clan 
members made up his special forces, the Red Berets (Duub Cas) and his son-in-law was 
the head of the National Security Service (NSS).  Barre’s new reliance on clan conflict 
sparked a revival of opposing clan activity and the recreation of clan based political 
parties.
In 1978, shortly after the conclusion of the Ogaden War, officers from the 
Majerteen clan attempted a coup, which was quickly suppressed and the seventeen 
alleged ringleaders executed. All but one of the officers executed were members of the 
Majerteen clan.  One of the few officers to escape was Lt. Colonel Abdullah Yusuf 
Ahmed, who formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which operated out 
of Ethiopia, with Ethiopian backing.  In response to the SSDF, Barre’s Red Berets 
destroyed water reservoirs to deny water to the clansmen and their herds.  In May and 
June of 1979, 2000 Majerteen died of thirst and the Somali military raped large numbers 
of women.   
Other clans began to create opposition parties as well, both internal and external 
to Somalia.  The Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed by 400 Isaq emigres in 
1981 in London, England.  The Isaq clan who inhabited the northern area of Somalia 
(what was British Somaliland) had long felt deprived as a clan and a region.  In 1988, 
they launched an attack in northern Somalia.  The Somali military responded with similar 
tactics as they did in the case of the Majerteen, killing 5000 Isaqs, 1000 being civilian 
deaths after the fact.  300,000 Isaq refugees were forced to flee to Ethiopia.28
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The Hawiye clan also found themselves in conflict with the MOD government.  
The Hawiye clan was concentrated in the southern portion of Somalia, centralized in the 
area around Mogadishu.  They had also enjoyed administrative and military positions;
however in the 1980s they felt marginalized by the huge amount of power the MOD 
horded.  Hawiye opposition brought MOD repression and the Hawiye founded the United 
Somali Congress (USC), which had a branch in Somalia and a branch in Rome, Italy. 29
By alienating the Hawiye, Barre also turned his last stronghold into enemy territory.  
Another major event that fueled the instigation of clan based warfare occurred 
when Siad Barre was involved in a major car accident in 1986.  Members of his Marehan 
clan became nervous about other clans gaining power, and they also were finding it 
difficult to find a successor, even within their own clan, in case Barre died.  While Barre 
was recovering, the Marehan wanted to sign a treaty with Ethiopia to collectively 
eliminate the SSDF and the SNM.  However this initiative angered the Ogaden clan, for 
they believed that the Marehan and Barre had sold out their homeland by plotting with 
Ethiopia.  These angered Ogadens also happened to be the majority in the Somali army, 
and so many left the army to form armed militias to try and achieve power themselves;
the largest being the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).30
One of the main reasons why so many armed groups were able to form and 
attempt to gain power was due to the mass amount of cold war weapons that had been 
flowing into Somalia.  Between the years of 1980 to 1988, the United States gave Siad 
Barre 163.5 million dollars in military aid, including 18.1 million to their M113 TOW 
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missile program, 8 million towards small arms and 11.6 million to M198 howitzers.31
This was in addition to the massive amount of weapons the Soviets had already given the 
Somalis and the lucrative and unending arms trade across the Ethiopian-Somali border.  
Barre used these weapons to unleash a campaign of “counter-insurgency” to eliminate 
rival clans.  In a 1990 report by Africa Watch, an affiliate of Human Rights Watch, it is
stated that between fifty and sixty thousand Somalis were killed in these campaigns 
between 1988 and 1990.
By 1989, Barre’s power had subsided so much, that he was known as the “mayor 
of Mogadishu” because his power barely extended outside of city limits.  There were clan 
based opposition parties stationed throughout the country that had begun to occupy and 
control various regions of Somalia.32  However the only thing linking the various clan 
groups opposing Barre was a common hatred of him.  No cooperation existed between 
the numerous opposition clans and there was never a plan for any form of government 
after the defeat of Barre.  Additionally, there was never any real plan of how to reconcile 
relations with the clans in the MOD and the clans that they oppressed under Barre.  
Furthermore, a developing generation of Somalis had never participated in democracy, or 
known anything except for the tribalism and dictatorship of Siad Barre.  This figures
heavily in conflict resolution in Somalia today, as literally some people have known 
nothing except for clan based warfare, and can do nothing except continue to co-exist in 
it.  
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The Hawiye based United Somali Congress (USC) took power from Barre, as he 
fled Mogadishu in 1991 and with some of his supporters started the Somali National 
Front (SNF).  The USC could not reconcile leadership differences between their Rome 
branch and their Somali branch, and thus before a new government could even be 
considered, the USC split; one faction keeping the name of the USC, and one forming the 
Somali Salvation Army (SSA).  Led by Mohammad Farah Aidid, the Somali branch of 
the USC eventually gained power in early 1991.  However the country was in a state of 
collapse, and various militias fought for the now vacant position of president of 
Somalia.33  Siad Barre lost in his attempt to regain power and died in Lagos, Nigeria in 
1995.  The fighting continues to this day and no clans have gained any superiority over 
any of the others or filled the post of president.  In the north, the Isaq clan formed enough 
mass based support from the population that they established the autonomous Somaliland 
which has basically the same boundaries of the former British Somaliland. 
The situation in Somalia today is still one of unresolved civil war.  The 
international community took some initial interest in Somalia’s problems, and from 1993 
to 1995 there were two UN humanitarian operations. However, neither was a success, 
and the UN and United States both sustained relatively heavy casualties.  Since the UN 
withdrawal in 1995, clan militias have descended further into lawlessness and many clan 
militias have transformed into armed gangs led by warlords.  Clan concepts such as reers 
have been long forgotten and most of the current militias only have loose clan 
connections if any at all.  In May 2006, heavy fighting broke out again, as various 
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warlords united under the banner Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-
Terrorism (ARPCT) battled the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) for control of Mogadishu.  
The ICU emerged as victorious, however the transitional government and the United 
States, who funded the warlords, refused to acknowledge the ICU because of its 
perceived ties to Al-Qaeda.  Despite claims of terrorist association by the United States, 
the ICU has been the only group in recent Somali history that has both tried to gain 
power and provide some type of assistance to the people.34  As of late April, Ethiopian 
troops had entered Somalia and placed a transitional government in place.  Since 
Ethiopian troops entered Somalia, hundreds more citizens have been killed and there is 
still no end in sight to the conflict.  The presence of Ethiopian soldiers has also enraged 
many Somalis who now feel as if their country is under occupation, making it even more 
difficult to form a viable government. 
Since the beginning of civil war in 1991, Doctors without Borders reports that 
over two million Somalis have been killed or displaced.  For those who are lucky enough 
to escape the chaos, one of their first stops were at refugee camps in Eastern Africa, many 
in neighboring Ethiopia.  From there, they were relocated to various points across the 
globe some of the most frequent destinations being England, other countries in the horn 
of Africa and the United States.  Statistics gathered from The United Nations High 
Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) show that the number of Somali born people coming 
to the United States jumped from 1737 in 1994 to 3487 in 1995.  These numbers continue 
to increase with a spike in 2002, with 4537 refugees entering the country.  Further 
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statistics confirm the influx of Somalis to the United States; as from the years 1995-2000, 
1,697 Somalis acquired United States’ citizenship while from 2000 to 2004, 9,030 
Somalis acquired citizenship.35
Somali Refugees and Clan Affiliation in Columbus Ohio
Although the initial migration of the Somali population to the United States was 
to Minneapolis, Minnesota, Columbus, Ohio quickly became a common and desired 
place to settle.  Columbus was able to attract newly arrived refugees because it had a 
growing job market, affordable housing, temperate climate, and now, it has an established 
Somali community, which is a major draw to Somalis.  According to the Economic and 
Community Development Institute, Columbus is now home to approximately 30,000 
Somalis and the Somali community has become an integral part of the culture of the city.  
The displacement of Somalis from their country, although unfortunate, has 
allowed for an interesting trend to emerge.  Although clan conflict is seen as the major 
barrier to securing peace in Somalia, once the refugees leave, clan conflicts no longer 
seem to be present.  One does not hear of Somalis fighting each other in refugee camps, 
or anywhere else in the Diaspora except in Somalia.  This phenomenon cannot be simply 
explained by their removal from Somalia, as the idea of Somali clans are so ingrained in 
their society that, regardless of where they traveled to, Somalis would still have a concept 
of which clan they were in.  One example of Somali unity and lack of strife can be seen 
in their settlement in Columbus.  
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As part of my research, I conducted interviews with two Somalis in Columbus 
and an African-American assistant principal who works closely with Somali students on a 
daily basis.  I conducted these interviews to become familiar with the Somali experience 
in Columbus, to gain a larger understanding of the role that clans played in their lives, 
and to discover why there is no clan conflict in Columbus.
One of the strengths of the Somali community in Columbus is the availability of 
assistance for refugees.  The United Way, Franklin County, the YMCA and a network of 
local organizations are readily available for refugees to get housing and job assistance, 
register for English as second language classes (ESL), receive and complete important 
documentation, and many other services.  After learning about various organizations and 
the services they provide, it is important to state that none of them even inquire about 
clan allegiances, much less discriminate on the basis of them.  However despite the lack 
of institutional tribalism in the United States, all Somali refugees face many problems 
when they arrive in America.        
According to Abdi Warsame, one of the Somalis who I interviewed, Somalis in 
Somalia see the United States as a haven; however the refugees from Somalia face a host 
of issues in Columbus, despite its overall attractiveness as a place to move.  Affordable 
housing is available, however Somali families on average have seven or eight people and 
most of the available houses in Columbus do not have sufficient space or legally restrict 
the number of residents allowed to inhabit the property.  Many times, as reported by 
Abdul Giama, families must split themselves up in order to find adequate housing.  The 
once booming job market of 1995 and 1996, when the refugees initially began arriving,
has slowed substantially, often making finding employment difficult.  American paranoia 
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regarding Islam is another major challenge that Somalis face.  Both interviewees stated 
“Americans believe all Muslims are terrorists,” a claim which both deny emphatically.  
However, many employers have not felt the same way, and many Somalis, especially 
those who worked at the airport found themselves jobless after September 11.   Another 
major change that awaits the refugees is the payment of bills.  Both Abdul and Abdi cite 
the sheer number of financial commitments and bills present in America as a major 
problem for refugees.  Many services that here require compensation, the socialist Somali 
state provided for free.  Especially because of the slow job market, many times Somali 
refugees are literally overwhelmed with bills they may or may not have the money to 
pay.36
Although these issues are of great concern to many Somalis, their difficulties 
serve to highlight their lack of conflict.  Both Abdul and Abdi note a lack of clan conflict 
once refugees arrive in America.  There could be many hypotheses to explain this
phenomenon.  In America, the refugees may be so busy with adjusting socially and 
economically that they do not have time to fight.  Another could be that in Columbus it is
not possible for refugees to fight each other; because they do not have access to weapons
here, and there are policemen and laws, currently in Somalia there are neither.
A better analysis, however, lies in examining the evolution of Somali clans.  
Clans in Somalia have been corrupted by Western government, cold war politics and a 
leader so power hungry that he was willing to pit all his countrymen against each other if 
allowed him to maintain his power.  One of the important steps in the evolution of Somali 
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clans occurred when they were forced to participate in Western style government.  In 
Columbus, refugees are not involved in the government, as most of them have not even 
attained citizenship and the right to vote.  Thus there is no vacuum of power that they feel 
needs to be filled.  Secondly, there are no historical Somali clan conflicts here. All
refugees get the opportunity to start clan relations anew, and not necessarily get caught 
up in clan conflicts that they did not instigate.  There are many people in militias in 
Somalia today who are fighting opposing clans and do not know why; some were not
born when the initial conflict began in the 1980s.  Thirdly, most Columbus residents have 
little to no knowledge of Somalia, and thus to them, all Somalis truly are the same and 
are classified not by clan, but as Somalis.  As a result, all of them are eligible to receive 
the same aid and favoritism is minimal if not nonexistent.  Thus, people in various clans 
have no resources to battle over, as they are not awarded goods and services and security 
based on clan allegiance.  Fourth, even in Somalia, those engaged in clan conflict are 
relatively few; most people who live there are simply civilians being negatively affected 
by warfare.  When they are pushed out of their country, many Somalis reject all the 
ideologies that forced them to leave; including the idea that one clan cannot cooperate 
with another.  Especially since going back to their country to rebuild is a sentiment that is 
heavily expressed, most Somalis have no interest in continuing the problems that have 
impeded nation building in the past.
Although Somalis in Columbus do not relate to the current clan based issues in 
Somalia, by no means do they lose their clan identity.  First, there are still some arenas in 
which clan rivalry presents itself, mostly in soccer games, and in personal opinions 
expressed mostly behind closed doors.  Another example of Somalis having difficulties in 
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achieving unity is displayed when there was an election for the President of the Somali 
Community Organization.  2,697 Somalis cast votes for seventeen candidates; with the 
results being contested, and many candidates declaring they were being discriminated 
against.37  Although this does demonstrate disunity within the community, many Somalis 
in Columbus have never voted in an election, so some of the confusion probably 
stemmed from that fact as opposed to simply an inability to compromise.  
Despite isolated examples of disunity, more traditional clan manifestations can be 
seen everyday in Columbus.  For instance, one of the cornerstones of Somali clans is 
kinship and a communal existence.  The main reason why Somalis have migrated to 
Columbus is because of family communication and contacts.  Abdul speaks of how new 
Somalis will arrive in Columbus and try to find work before they expatriate the rest of 
their family.  They must stay with friends and/ or relatives, many times having to bounce 
from family to family in order to have a place to stay.  If clan rivalries existed in 
America, there would be no way that this could occur without constant difficulty.  
Assistant principal Dennis Dorsey informed me that within Mifflin High School in 
Columbus, all the Somalis protect each other, regardless of clan affiliation.  Furthermore, 
Dorsey reports that even intra-Somali conflict, regardless of clan, is seen as counter 
productive and useless.  When two Somali students got into a fight at the high school, the 
clan chief came into the school to help resolve the conflict and specifically promote 
Somali unity- the boys never fought again. 38  This type of mediation by elders in the 
community is a traditional aspect of Somali conflict resolution, however recently has not 
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succeeded in Somalia where there have been countless conferences aimed at achieving
peace with no positive results.
The Success of Somaliland
Despite the inability of Southern Somalia to resolve their issues of unity, there is 
optimistic news for both Somalia and its displaced people flowing from the northern 
portion of the country.  The creation, albeit not “legally,” of Somaliland demonstrates 
that Somalis are quite capable of governing themselves and serves as a model of political 
compromise that hopefully will influence the rest of the country.  Somaliland occupies 
the area that used to be called British Somaliland.  Whereas the rest of Somalia has 
continued to spiral into anarchy, Somaliland adopted a constitution in 2001, held local 
elections in 2002, and fair presidential elections in 2003.  Although it still faces major 
issues of poverty and lacks international representation, Somaliland has managed to 
achieve what seemed like the impossible; they have united various clans under a 
republican system.
There are many reasons why Somaliland has had greater success in terms of unity 
than the rest of the country.  Firstly, as I have mentioned earlier, the differences in 
colonial administration played a large role.  The British had few interests in northern 
Somalia except in “getting cheap meat to feed its Aden garrison and in keeping the 
French out, England treated its Somali colony with benign neglect.”39  Thus, they allowed 
the Somalis to maintain many of their native political traditions which are currently 
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integral to Somaliland’s success.  Another reason for the unity of Somaliland is their 
historic marginalization by the more dominant Southern Somalia.  This fostered a general 
spirit of separatism among the northern population.  Finally, the fact that the Isaq clan 
makes up such a large percentage of the population, around 70%, consolidating power 
has been somewhat easier.   In the past, however, dominant clans have strayed to 
tribalism and oppression when it comes to sharing power, so in that respect how has 
Somaliland been able to preserve the peace and allow for all clans to participate equally?
The fact that Somaliland has maintained its traditional political institutions is 
absolutely fundamental to its success.  The “hands off approach” of British colonialism is 
important, but more so currently significant is Somaliland’s lack of international 
recognition.  The lack of international recognition means that it does not qualify for 
bilateral aid, or support from institutions like the World Bank or The Internal Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and also has almost no role in international politics or economics.  
Although this has restricted Somaliland from initiating many domestic improvement 
programs and infrastructure construction, it also has guaranteed that they do not have to 
answer to any international body or fall within any of their Western guidelines.  
Essentially, for the first time since the 1960s, Somalis are in control of their own destiny.   
Another aspect of Somaliland’s embrace of traditional governance is the manner 
in which their parliament is structured.  Somaliland’s bi-cameral parliament fuses modern 
and traditional ideas; the Senate consists of traditional elders who are appointed, while 
the House of Representatives are comprised of elected representatives.  Furthermore, 
Article 9 in the Somaliland constitution states that only three political parties are allowed;
they cannot be clan based, and must gain support from four of the six Somaliland 
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regions.40  This idea attempts to reduce the emphasis that clans have on the political 
process and forces clans to make alliances which facilitates compromise, integration, and 
pluralism.  So far, this idea has been very successful.  In the parliamentary elections of 
2005, over 90% of Somaliland’s residents turned out to vote, indicating a clear desire and 
ability to co-exist peacefully.41  Furthermore, the system of governance is having a 
positive affect on clan relations, as localized efforts, especially those of the elders, are 
finding success in terms of conflict mediation, restored trust among clans, and increased 
reliance on traditional laws to solves disputes.    
Understanding and advancing the concepts behind Somaliland is absolutely 
integral to rebuilding Somalia.  Despite still being a young country and having no 
international recognition, Somaliland has peacefully created a government which not 
only provides for their people, but also downplays clan allegiance and relies on 
traditional ideas as opposed to Western based ones, which have not found success in the 
Horn of Africa.  The example of Somaliland demonstrates that Somalis are very 
interested in governing themselves, living in peace, and clearly have the capacity to do 
so.  Although the clan diversity is not as widespread as in the south, by using similar 
ideas as the north, all of Somalia can reunite and begin to rebuild their country.  The use 
of traditional elders to help and reconcile rival clans and promote unity on a local level, 
and the use of a mixed traditional and modern parliament on a national level are perhaps 
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two of the most important concepts that need to be further analyzed and spread beyond 
the realm of Somaliland and into the entire nation.   
Conclusion
The current situation in Somalia is even more complex and the population more 
divided then it was in 1991.  Even after fifteen years of civil war there is no government, 
no real humanitarian aid for the people and the one group who appears to be able to unite 
the country is portrayed as a terrorist organization by the Western media.  Somalia is a 
failure as a modern free state and, regrettably, many of its problems were caused by 
external factors that grew out of colonial rule.  The one recent success of Somalia is its 
refugees’ ability to relocate, start their lives again, and be a positive and integral part of 
their new communities.  Additionally, Somali refugees serve as a universal model for 
unity and willingness to help other Somalis in need.  This is especially true in Columbus 
Ohio.  When comparing the unity of the Columbus refugees to the factionalism in 
Somalia, one sees almost two separate identities.  I contend that the refugees are 
operating within an authentic Somali cultural identity, however when separated from the 
chaos historical connotations of Somalia, they manifest their clan identity in a more 
traditional, communal, and non violent manner.  In Somalia, however, clans have been so 
manipulated and divided for the past sixty years that they can only manifest themselves 
as armed militias fighting for power.
The traditional concept behind Somali clans is a network of assistance, which is 
exactly the purpose they serve in Columbus.  Conflict is minimal and isolated, and most 
Somalis go out of their way to help others, regardless of clan.  Whether it is through 
temporary housing assistance, word of mouth communications concerning jobs, or even 
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Somalis protecting each other in high school, Somali unity is ever-present and genuine.  
In Somalia, the concept of clan began as a network of assistance to cope with harsh 
conditions and nomadic traditions, but changed when European powers imposed an alien 
centralized system of government upon them, with the expectation that they would 
succeed.  During the early years of independence, infant Somali nationalism attempted to 
overshadow clan politics and for a short while succeeded.  However Barre’s takeover 
signaled the turn to scientific socialism which suppressed clan activity, stifled clan 
growth in this influential period, and declared tribalism as the main impediment to 
Somali nationalism.
Clan conflict only increased after Siad Barre and Somalia’s defeat in the Ogaden 
War and the resulting administrative shifts concerning clan relations.  After cold war 
politics spelled defeat for Somalia, nationalist fervor and a policy of anti-tribalism was 
replaced by Barre’s use of tribalism to keep his opponents fighting amongst themselves
while he maintained power.  Furthermore, he used his clan members, the MOD, to 
violently quell opposition which further splinted the idea of unity.  Adding to the 
difficulties of reconciling the clan conflict was the fact that both Barre and his enemies 
basically enjoyed endless access to weaponry as cold war politics flooded both Somalia 
and neighboring Ethiopia with weapons.  Although the defeat of Barre in 1991 was 
probably beneficial to Somalia as a whole, it plunged the country into civil war with clan 
based militias controlling different regions of the country.  The various clans have never 
negotiated a plan of government for Somalia after Barre.  Many of the members of the 
militias have no experience with democracy, state building or peace, and thus fighting 
continues to this day.  
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A common sentiment present in many Somali refugee accounts of their 
experiences is the desire to return and aid their country.  Hopefully, the unity that prevails 
outside of Somalia can one day be instrumental in reconciling the factions within the 
country, and the concept of clans can once again exemplify assistance and kinship as 
opposed to division and violence.  Furthermore, the true or traditional purpose of clans 
must be emphasized and utilized to help rebuild the country, and create a system of 
governance that is natural to Somalis, as opposed to the imitation of Western style 
democracies.  Finally, clans should not be rejected by Somalis in the future; they are 
integral and ingrained in their society.  Instead Somalis must focus to balance their clan 
allegiance with a national identity.  Any sort of optimism must be contained until peace is 
reached; however if kinship and assistance can flourish in Somalia the way that it does in 
the United States, then Somalis have an extremely bright future despite a rather dismal 
past sixty years.                   
On the Future of Somalia
Somalia in many respects can be quite depressing.  However even in its state of 
civil war, Somalia still holds the potential to reunite and solve their political and social 
conflicts.  A fatalistic attitude and blaming Siad Barre or the West for Somalia’s 
problems has its time and place; however, at a certain point, it is much more productive 
to understand why Somalia faces the problems it does and try and solve them, as opposed 
to wallowing in its failures.  In this spirit, I will attempt to mention just a few topics that 
should be further discussed, analyzed, and perhaps instituted, to make Somalia a peaceful 
and free country again.    
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The first key for Somalia is to resolve the civil war and stop the violence.  No 
positive governmental institutions can function in a state of civil war and the people 
cannot be expected to become involved in deciding their future if they have to worry 
about their safety on a consistent basis.  This is absolutely the first step to Somalia’s 
future success.  Secondly, in the past, people have supported international intervention, 
mainly from the West, to militarily resolve the war and provide humanitarian aid.  One of 
the main reasons that Somalia has been in war so long is because countries who have 
intervened in the past, specifically the United States and currently Ethiopia, all have their 
own agendas, and none of them put the Somali people first.  One of Somaliland’s main 
successes in creating a government of their own liking is that they receive no 
international aid and thus are not responsible to anyone except their own people.  
Obviously Somalia, even if united, will have a major economic difficulty in terms of 
addressing their widespread poverty.  However, relying on other countries for general 
assistance may just represent a continuous cycle of African exploitation.
Finally, I feel as if one of Somalia’s most challenging issues lies in the scope and 
size of their Diaspora.  On one hand, uniting all Somalis throughout the world and who 
clearly, as exemplified by the population in Columbus, have many things to worry about 
is a difficult task.  However, conversely, the fact that so many are not constricted by the 
contemporary conditions in Somalia means they have the ability to foster their traditional 
and positive identities, return to Somalia, and have an immensely positive role.  
Furthermore, they have the political and economic experiences and resources to help and 
rebuild their country.  They also have the desire to only emphasize traditional clan 
identities which will be extremely important in terms of reconciling the clan conflict and 
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identity crisis which is currently manifesting itself there.  Although this process may take 
time as many in the Diaspora must first establish themselves, the Somalis not living in 
Somalia should, can, and will play an integral role in terms of reuniting Somalia and 
ending its strife. 
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